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Abstract	1 
Integrating	information	from	existing	research,	qualitative	ethnographic	interviews,	and	2 
participant	observation,	we	designed	a	field	experiment	that	introduces	idiosyncratic	3 
environmental	risk	and	a	voluntary	sharing	decision	into	a	standard	public	goods	game.	Conducted	4 
with	subsistence	resource	users	in	rural	villages	in	remote	Kamchatka	Russia,	we	find	evidence	5 
consistent	with	a	model	of	indirect	reciprocity	and	local	social	norms	of	helping	the	needy.	When	6 
experiments	allow	participants	to	develop	reputations,	as	is	the	case	in	most	small‐scale	societies,	7 
we	find	that	sharing	is	increasingly	directed	toward	individuals	experiencing	hardship,	good	8 
reputations	increase	aid,	and	risk‐pooling	becomes	more	effective.	Our	results	highlight	the	9 
importance	of	investigating	social	and	ecological	factors,	beyond	strategic	risk,	that	affect	the	10 
balance	between	independence	and	interdependence	when	developing	and	testing	theories	of	11 
cooperation.	12 
	13 
	 	14 
3	
Introduction	1 
Research	on	cooperation	and	collective	action	often	focuses	on	strategic	risks—the	costs	and	2 
benefits	of	cooperating	or	defecting—and	associated	free‐riding	behavior	in	a	single	domain	(1,	2).	3 
Expected	payoffs	are	a	function	of	individual	and	group	choices,	and	interactions	are	typically	4 
limited	to	a	production	or	investment	domain.	Previous	studies	have	found	that	rewards	can	5 
mitigate	the	costs	of	cooperation	(3,	4),	punishment	can	increase	the	costs	of	defection	(5–8),	6 
reputations	can	facilitate	positive	assortment	among	cooperators	(9),	and	cultural	norms	and	7 
institutions	can	structure	incentives	and	expectations	in	ways	that	sustain	cooperation	(1,	10).		8 
In	small‐scale	resource	dependent	communities,	cooperation	can	often	occur	in	multiple	9 
domains,	such	as	contributing	to	a	public	good,	harvesting	from	a	shared	resource,	punishing	10 
defectors,	rewarding	cooperators	or	sharing	with	those	who	experience	a	hardship	(11–13).	These	11 
domains	usually	interact	which	reflects	the	fact	that	benefits	of	cooperation	can	extend	beyond	a	12 
single	period,	domain,	or	state	of	nature.	Cooperation	may	be	preferred	to	non‐cooperation	13 
precisely	because	future	states	of	nature	are	uncertain	in	one	or	more	linked	domains.	As	such,	14 
environmental	risk—defined	as	the	spatial	and	temporal	fluctuations	in	biotic	and	abiotic	15 
components	of	the	environment	that	affect	access	to	resources,	health,	and	other	measures	of	16 
human	well‐being—could	increase	interdependence	and,	as	a	result,	long‐term	success	depends	17 
upon	cooperation	in	multiple	domains.	18 
	 Idiosyncratic	environmental	risk	creates	uncertainty	about	future	payoffs	in	a	collective	19 
action	problem.	Individual	harvesting	success	may	be	stochastic,	harvested	resources	may	spoil,	20 
animals	may	destroy	stored	food,	or	an	injury	may	prevent	the	individual	from	participating	in	21 
collective	action.	In	subsistence	communities,	when	an	individual	experiences	a	hardship,	or	a	22 
“shock,”	his	or	her	survival	depends	upon	the	largesse	of	others.	Thus,	the	decisions	about	sharing	23 
subsistence	resources	may	depend	upon	the	individual’s	reputation	for	cooperating	in	other	24 
4	
domains.	Although	environmental	risk	can	increase	variation	in	the	production	domain,	sharing	1 
among	individuals	and	households	can	compensate	for	these	short‐term	production	deficits,	linking	2 
strategic	dynamics	and	cooperation	across	the	two	domains	(14–17).		3 
	 In	this	paper	we	present	results	from	a	framed	public	goods	experiment,	conducted	in	4 
subsistence‐dependent	communities	in	Siberia,	designed	to	test	how	idiosyncratic	environmental	5 
risk	interacts	with	strategic	risk	to	affect	cooperation	within	and	between	the	production	and	6 
sharing	domains.	Consistent	with	a	model	of	indirect	reciprocity, our	results	indicate	that	decisions	7 
in	the	sharing	domain	are	conditioned	on	reputations	for	cooperation	in	the	production	domain.	We	8 
also	find	evidence	for	risk‐pooling,	as	individuals	share	more	with	those	in	need.	Further,	when	9 
reputations	for	cooperation	extend	across	multiple	rounds,	the	aid	provided	to	cooperators	10 
increases	substantially	and	risk‐pooling	becomes	more	effective—a	result	that	highlights	the	11 
importance	of	local	social	norms	which	emphasize	resource	sharing	and	helping	the	needy	(18,	19).	12 
However,	the	rewards	from	sharing	are	insufficient	to	improve	cooperation	in	the	production	13 
domain.	Similarly,	we	find	cooperation	in	the	production	domain	is	unaffected	by	environmental	14 
risk	that	is	unavoidable,	consistent	with	theoretical	predictions.	15 
Environmental	Risk	and	Cooperation	16 
Because	environmental	risk	introduces	variability	in	resource	acquisition,	it	can	be	difficult	or	17 
impossible	for	a	solitary	individual	to	consistently	acquire	sufficient	resources	to	survive.	Thus,	18 
environmental	risks	can	affect	the	relative	viability	of	independent	versus	cooperative	behavior.	19 
Previous	research	shows	that	environmental	risk	affects	cooperation	over	rivalrous	goods	in	small‐20 
scale,	resource‐dependent	communities.	In	theoretical	studies,	environmental	risk	or	uncertainty	21 
can	increase	or	decrease	cooperation	in	social	dilemmas	(20,	21).	Experimental	studies	generally	22 
find	that	increasing	the	variability	of	returns	to	either	the	group	or	private	account	reduces	23 
5	
cooperation	in	the	riskier	domain	(22–24);	in	contrast	the	idiosyncratic	shock	in	our	design	is	1 
unavoidable,	it	affects	both	the	group	and	private	accounts	equally.	2 
Although	environmental	risks	have	received	relatively	less	attention	in	research	on	3 
cooperation	and	collective	action,	theoretical	and	empirical	studies	of	risk‐pooling	in	anthropology	4 
(25,	26)	and	economics	(27,	28)	have	explored	interactions	between	strategic	and	environmental	5 
risks.	Smith	(29)	suggests	risk‐pooling	is	likely	to	occur	when	an	individual’s	success	in	resource	6 
acquisition	exhibits	stochastic	variation	that	is	asynchronous	among	individuals,	creating	7 
opportunities	for	individuals	to	reduce	environmental	risk	by	sharing	resources.	Related	economic	8 
studies	have	identified	the	use	of	non‐market	mechanisms—including	informal	loans,	remittances,	9 
and	social	networks—to	pool	risk	and	minimize	the	negative	effects	of	consumption	variability	(16,	10 
30,	31).		11 
Smoothing	consumption	by	pooling	resources	can	enhance	odds	of	survival,	but	this	form	of	12 
cooperation	entails	strategic	risk	in	both	the	production	and	sharing	domains.	As	such,	the	13 
insurance	provided	by	pooling	resources	presents	another	social	dilemma	since	free‐riders	may	14 
benefit	without	contributing,	undermining	the	long‐term	stability	of	risk‐pooling.	Related	15 
theoretical	models	have	shown	a	strong	commitment	device	is	needed	to	facilitate	effective	risk‐16 
pooling,	insuring	the	long‐term	benefits	of	participation	exceed	the	short‐term	gains	of	leaving	a	17 
network	(32).		18 
	 Experimental	research	echoes	the	results	of	these	models.	Studies	have	explored	19 
commitment	in	the	context	of	endogenous	group	formation	(33,	34).	For	example,	Barr	and	Genicot	20 
(33)	found	individuals	were	most	likely	to	form	risk‐pooling	groups	in	the	presence	of	a	strong,	21 
exogenously	enforced,	commitment	device.	Charness	and	Genicot	(35)	find	strong	evidence	for	risk‐22 
pooling	with	a	limited	commitment	device;	however,	direct	reciprocity	is	a	central	feature	of	their	23 
6	
incentive	structure.	In	contrast,	direct	reciprocity	is	not	an	explicit	feature	of	our	design,	which	1 
allows	us	to	test	for	risk	sharing	in	the	absence	of	commitment	devices.		2 
Our	study	complements	existing	research	by	integrating	insights	on	risk‐pooling	with	more	3 
general	theoretical	and	empirical	research	on	cooperation.	Specifically,	we	combine	factors	that	4 
increase	interdependence	and	encourage	risk‐pooling—stochastic	resource	acquisition	and	5 
voluntary	resource	sharing—with	factors	that	amplify	strategic	risks	of	defection—rewards	and	6 
reputations.	We	utilize	methodological	tools	from	anthropology	and	economics	to	design	a	series	of	7 
field	experiments	involving	136	participants	from	3	villages	located	on	the	Kamchatka	Peninsula	in	8 
Northeast	Siberia.	People	living	in	Kamchatka’s	remote	villages	must	continually	cope	with	9 
strategic	and	environmental	risks,	with	limited	support	from	formal	institutions	(36).	Prior	to	the	10 
experiments,	we	conducted	qualitative	ethnographic	interviews	and	participant	observation	to	11 
identify	the	particular	strategic	and	environmental	risks	that	people	in	Kamchatka	face.	These	12 
insights	informed	the	design	of	our	experiments.	13 
Research	Design	14 
Our	field	experiments	were	conducted	in	three	small	communities	in	the	Karaginskii	region	of	15 
Kamchatka	over	a	four	day	period	in	each	community	during	Spring	2011.	This	is	a	large,	remote	16 
region	(40,600	km2)	with	a	small	population	(4,824	people)	that	is	dependent	upon	harvesting	local	17 
resources	for	subsistence.	Approximately	85%	of	experiment	participants	were	indigenous	and	had	18 
lived	in	the	area	for	most	of	their	lives.			19 
Subjects	were	recruited	through	bulletin	board	announcements,	door‐to‐door	visits,	and	by	20 
a	local	community	coordinator.	Experiments	were	conducted	in	Russian	and	all	supporting	21 
materials	were	presented	in	Russian.	Participants	read	a	consent	form	prior	to	the	start	of	the	22 
experiment	and	provided	verbal	affirmation	of	informed	consent	prior	to	participation.	Signatures	23 
were	not	collected	since	our	study	was	determined	to	be	of	minimal	risk,	subjects	experienced	risk	24 
7	
similar	to	that	encountered	in	everyday	life,	and	signatures	would	have	unnecessarily	linked	1 
subjects	to	the	study.	Investigator	contact	information	was	provided	to	subjects	and	left	with	village	2 
mayors	and	community	coordinators.	Researchers	returned	to	communities	two	years	later	to	3 
report	related	research	findings	to	participants	and	community	members.	Our	study	and	consent	4 
procedures	were	approved	by	the	UAA	Institutional	Review	Board	(project	id	#216266).	The	5 
protocol	was	pre‐tested	with	native	Russian‐speaking	students	at	the	University	of	Alaska	6 
Anchorage.	Instructions	were	read	aloud	and	accompanied	by	PowerPoint	slides	projected	onto	a	7 
screen.	Instructions	in	English	and	Russian,	field	protocol,	and	an	image	of	information	displayed	to	8 
subjects,	can	be	found	at	the	data	review	url	included	in	our	submission.	9 
Each	session	lasted	approximately	three	hours,	during	which	subjects	played	a	modified	10 
version	of	a	linear	public	goods	game.	Experiments	were	hand‐run,	with	the	aid	of	a	single	laptop	11 
computer	and	a	projector.	For	each	round,	decisions	were	written	on	slips	of	paper,	collected	by	12 
one	of	the	experimenters,	and	entered	into	a	spreadsheet.	Results	were	projected	onto	the	screen,	13 
and	subjects	wrote	the	outcomes	on	a	record	sheet.	Once	this	process	was	completed,	another	14 
round	followed.	15 
Subjects	were	randomly	assigned	to	one	of	two	five‐person	groups.	In	4	of	the	sessions	16 
there	was	one	5	person	group	and	one	4	person	group.	In	the	remaining	10	sessions	there	were	2	17 
five	person	groups.	In	all	treatments,	individuals	were	identified	by	a	letter	known	only	by	the	18 
individual	and	the	experimenter.	Thus,	although	participants	knew	the	composition	of	each	group,	19 
there	was	no	way	for	other	group	members	to	link	an	individual	to	his	or	her	decisions.	Moreover,	20 
with	one	exception	(described	later),	each	individual’s	letter	randomly	varied	every	round.	This	21 
method	eliminated	the	possibility	of	using	information	about	a	particular	group	member’s	actions	22 
in	prior	rounds	and	prevented	individuals	from	developing	reputations.	23 
8	
Subjects	were	paid	in	cash,	with	average	earnings	of	610	rubles	(about	$22	US	dollars	at	the	1 
time),	equivalent	to	a	typical	daily	wage.	In	addition,	all	participants	received	a	200	ruble	show‐up	2 
payment.			3 
	 The	modified	public	goods	game	was	framed	as	team	subsistence	production	(37,	38),	and	4 
consisted	of	two	stages.	Stage	1	was	identical	for	all	groups	and	consisted	of	a	standard	linear	5 
public	goods	game	for	five	rounds.	This	serves	as	our	Baseline	Treatment.	Each	round,	every	6 
individual	started	with	an	initial	endowment	of	50	“hours”	which	had	to	be	allocated	between	an	7 
individual	and	a	group	activity.		The	activity	was	framed	as	“fishing,	hunting,	or	collecting	8 
mushrooms	and	berries…”	where	“sometimes	you	do	these	activities	on	your	own”	(the	individual	9 
production	activity)	but	“sometimes	you	do	them	with	other	people”	(the	group	production	10 
activity).	Each	hour	allocated	to	the	individual	activity	yielded	a	private	return	of	10	rubles.	Time	11 
allocated	to	the	group	activity	yielded	20	rubles	per	hour,	because	“people	often	get	more	done	12 
when	working	together.”	Returns	from	the	group	activity	were	divided	equally	among	all	group	13 
members,	regardless	of	the	time	allocated.	At	the	end	of	each	round,	the	allocation	decision	of	each	14 
group	member	was	publicly	revealed	(identified	only	by	a	letter).	15 
	 Stage	2	consisted	of	eight	additional	rounds	under	one	of	four	sharing	treatments.		16 
Treatments	varied	in	terms	of	the	presence	of	environmental	risk	and	incentives	to	cooperate	as	17 
determined	by	the	information	available	to	subjects	when	making	decisions.	In	all	treatments,	18 
subjects	first	made	the	same	time	allocation	decision	as	in	Stage	1.	After	the	decisions	were	made,	19 
some	information	was	revealed,	then	subjects	were	given	the	opportunity	to	share	rubles	with	20 
other	group	members.	The	instructions	emphasized	the	voluntary	nature	of	sharing	and	used	the	21 
Russian	verb	podelit’sya	(“to	share”).	There	was	no	restriction	on	the	number	of	fellow	group	22 
members	with	whom	an	individual	could	share.	To	avoid	sharing	commitments	in	excess	of	an	23 
individual’s	earnings,	the	total	amount	shared	by	an	individual	was	limited	to	250	rubles.	Table	1.	24 
summarizes	key	information	for	each	treatment.	25 
9	
Table	1.	Experimental	Design	1 
Risk	and	Sharing	Treatment Information	Revealed	Prior	to	Sharing	Decision
Treatment	 N	
Idiosyncratic	
Risk	
Voluntary	
Sharing	
Player	
Shocked	
Allocation	
decisions	in	
current	round	
All	decisions	in	
prior	rounds	
Baseline	 136	 no	 no ‐‐ ‐‐	 ‐‐
Reward	 40	 no	 yes ‐‐ yes	 no
Shock	 29	 yes	 yes yes no	 no
No	Reputation	 38	 yes	 yes yes yes	 no
With	Reputation	 29	 yes	 yes yes yes	 yes
 2 
Reward	Treatment.	The	first	treatment	was	identical	to	the	Baseline	except	that	after	time	3 
allocation	decisions	were	completed	and	publicly	revealed,	subjects	made	a	sharing	decision.	4 
Because	individual	time	allocation	decisions	were	common	knowledge,	subjects	could	use	sharing	5 
as	a	mechanism	to	reward	others	for	contributing	to	the	group	activity	in	the	current	period	or	to	6 
indirectly	punish	non‐cooperators	by	withholding	sharing,	increasing	the	cost	of	defection	relative	7 
to	the	Baseline	Treatment.	Because	sharing	was	a	zero‐sum	transfer,	it	had	no	impact	on	group	8 
earnings.	After	sharing	decisions	were	collected,	the	amounts	shared	and	received	were	revealed	to	9 
the	group.	Note	that	in	all	Stage	2	treatments,	only	aggregate	sharing	outcomes	were	revealed;	the	10 
amount	transferred	between	two	particular	players	was	not	disclosed.	This	treatment	is	similar	to	11 
the	Reward	Treatment	in	Sefton,	Shupp	and	Walker	(39).	12 
Risk	Treatment.	The	second	treatment	introduced	idiosyncratic	environmental	risk.	After	the	time	13 
allocation	decisions	were	made,	but	before	they	were	revealed,	one	individual	from	each	group	was	14 
randomly	selected	by	the	roll	of	a	die	to	incur	a	“shock”	which	was	described	as	“not	catching	any	15 
fish,	getting	sick,	or	having	all	the	food	you’ve	gathered	spoil.”	The	individual	who	incurred	the	16 
shock	lost	all	earnings	from	both	the	group	and	individual	activities.	Only	the	amount	received	from	17 
voluntary	sharing	by	others	determined	the	individual’s	earnings	for	that	round.	The	letter	of	the	18 
individual	incurring	the	shock	was	announced	to	the	group	prior	to	the	sharing	decision.	After	the	19 
10	
sharing	decisions	were	collected,	both	the	time	allocation	and	sharing	decisions	of	all	group	1 
members	were	revealed.					2 
Risk/Reward	Treatment.	The	third	treatment	was	identical	to	the	Risk	Treatment,	except	that	3 
prior	to	the	sharing	decision,	both	the	letter	of	the	individual	shocked	and	the	allocation	decisions	4 
of	all	group	members	were	revealed.	This	allowed	sharing	to	be	based	on	whether	an	individual	5 
was	shocked	and/or	the	individual’s	time	allocation	in	the	current	period.	After	the	sharing	6 
decisions	were	collected,	the	individual	sharing	and	time	allocation	decisions	were	revealed	to	the	7 
group.		8 
Risk/Reward/Reputation	Treatment.	In	the	final	treatment	(which	we	will	refer	to	as	the	9 
Reputation	Treatment),	individual	player	letters	were	constant	across	rounds,	but	otherwise	10 
followed	the	same	rules	as	the	Risk/Reward	Treatment.	Holding	player	letters	constant	created	an	11 
opportunity	for	individuals	to	develop	a	reputation	for	cooperative	behavior	not	only	in	the	12 
production	domain,	but	also	the	sharing	domain.	This	allowed	other	group	members	to	condition	13 
sharing	on	these	reputations.	The	Reputation	Treatment	brings	the	experiment	closer	to	naturally	14 
occurring	contexts	of	cooperation	in	small‐scale	societies,	where	individuals	have	access	to	and	15 
utilize	reputations.	16 
	 Individual	cash	earnings	were	determined	by	a	single	round	that	was	randomly	selected	by	17 
a	die	roll	at	the	end	of	the	experiment	(13,	35).	Selecting	a	single	round	eliminated	the	possibility	18 
for	subjects	to	pool	earnings	over	time,	which	would	have	been	analogous	to	individually	insuring	19 
against	shocks.	Our	design	choice	parallels	field	conditions	in	northern	Kamchatka	where	there	is	20 
substantial	seasonal	variation	in	weather	and	resource	availability	and	it	is	difficult	to	self‐insure	21 
against	shocks	to	subsistence	harvests.		22 
11	
Related	Studies	and	Hypotheses	1 
The	design	of	our	experiment	is	most	similar	to	a	computerized	laboratory	experiment	by	Cherry,	2 
Howe,	and	Murphy	(13)	but	differs	in	terms	of	the	framing,	the	source	of	the	shock,	the	nature	of	3 
sharing,	and	the	amount	of	information	revealed.	They	find	strong	evidence	for	risk‐pooling	4 
without	a	commitment	device.	In	contrast,	our	design	introduces	unavoidable	idiosyncratic	risk	and	5 
allows	us	to	test	the	effect	of	reputations	on	sharing	and	cooperation	decisions.		6 
	 In	each	of	our	treatments,	the	static	Nash	equilibrium	allocations	to	the	group	activity	and	7 
to	sharing	are	both	zero.	Further,	because	direct	reciprocity	was	not	possible	in	our	game	8 
environment	given	actual	decisions,	sharing	arrangements	are	not	self‐enforcing;	that	is,	the	9 
expected	future	individual	gain	from	cooperating	by	sharing	does	not	exceed	the	current	benefit	of	10 
defecting.	Essential	features	of	this	decision	environment	have	been	modeled	by	Nowak	and	11 
Sigmund	(9)	who	explore	cooperation	via	indirect	reciprocity.	In	our	decision	environment,	indirect	12 
reciprocity	is	defined	as	the	sharing	given	to	an	individual	that	is	conditioned	on	the	observed	13 
cooperation	of	that	individual	with	other	group	members	in	both	the	production	and	sharing	14 
domains	when	possible	(9,	40).			15 
A	growing	number	of	experimental	studies	provide	support	for	the	importance	of	16 
reputation	and	the	role	of	indirect	reciprocity	in	cooperation	and	collective	action	(4,	9,	40–42).	In	17 
the	context	of	two	linked	cooperative	domains,	Panchanathan	&	Boyd	(43)	suggest	indirect	18 
reciprocity	depends	on	two	conditions:	1)	reputations	formed	by	actions	in	the	first	domain	19 
increase	benefits	received	in	the	second	domain	and	2)	the	benefits	of	a	good	reputation	in	the	20 
second	domain	exceed	the	costs	of	cooperation	in	the	first	domain.	We	investigate	how	21 
environmental	risk	affects	these	strategic	dynamics	of	reputation	and	indirect	reciprocity.	22 
	 By	comparing	decisions	across	the	four	treatments	in	Stage	2,	we	can	test	the	extent	to	23 
which	time	allocation	and	sharing	decisions	are	interlinked	and	how	they	respond	to	risk.	Based	on	24 
12	
the	Panchanathan	&	Boyd	(43)	model	of	indirect	reciprocity,	we	hypothesize	that	sharing	decisions	1 
will	be	conditioned	on	observable	behavior,	and	people	who	exhibit	more	cooperation	in	these	2 
domains	will	receive	more	support.	This	implies	that in	the	Reward	Treatment,	subjects	will	use	3 
sharing	to	reward	cooperation	and	will	punish	non‐cooperators	by	withholding	sharing	(H1).		In	4 
the	Risk	Treatment,	those	experiencing	a	hardship	will	receive	additional	support,	but	it	will	be	5 
independent	of	allocation	and	sharing	decisions	because	these	are	unobservable	(H2).	In	the	6 
Risk/Reward	Treatment,	sharing	will	be	directed	towards	the	individual	who	was	shocked	and	7 
sharing	will	increase	with	the	shocked	individual’s	group	allocation	decision	in	the	current	round	8 
(H3).	In	the	Reputation	Treatment,	the	amount	shared	with	a	shocked	individual	should	increase	9 
with	both	his	or	her	allocation	decision	in	the	current	period	and	his	or	her	sharing	decision	in	the	10 
previous	period	(H4).	Finally,	if	we	observe	sharing	that	is	conditioned	on	allocations	to	the	group	11 
activity	in	the	final	two	treatments,	then	we	expect	the	amount	of	time	allocated	to	the	group	12 
activity	will	be	greater	than	in	the	Risk	treatment,	which	does	not	facilitate	conditional	sharing	13 
(H5).	14 
Results	15 
Sharing.	In	the	Reward	Treatment,	the	average	amount	received	from	sharing	was	96	rubles.	In	the	16 
three	treatments	with	idiosyncratic	risk,	the	average	amount	received	was	not	substantially	17 
different;	however,	sharing	was	overwhelmingly	directed	toward	those	experiencing	a	hardship.		18 
Moreover,	the	more	a	shocked	individual	cooperated	in	the	production	domain,	the	more	he	or	she	19 
received	from	sharing.	We	explore	this	result	with	four	random	effects	regression	models	in	Table	20 
2,	one	regression	for	each	of	the	four	Stage	2	treatments.	The	models	all	use	the	same	basic	21 
structure:	Yit = 0 + 1it + 2t + i + it,	where	in	Table	2.	Yit	is	the	total	amount	received	in	22 
sharing	by	subject	i	in	round	t	[6,13],	it	is	a	set	of	independent	variables	that	control	for	whether	23 
each	individual	was	shocked,	the	amount	shared	in	the	previous	period,	the	amount	allocated	to	the	24 
13	
group	activity	in	the	current	period,	and	interactions	of	these	variables,	i	captures	unobserved	1 
individual	subject	characteristics	and	it	represents	the	contemporaneous	error	term.	Because	2 
subjects	participated	in	multiple	rounds	of	a	single	treatment,	subject‐specific	heterogeneity	is	3 
modeled	as	a	random	effect.	We	use	a	Huber	(44)	and	White	(45)	robust	estimate	of	variance.	4 
Table	2.	Individual	Amount	Received	from	Sharing	(Stage	2)	5 
	 Reward Risk Risk	/Reward	 Reputation
Amount	Sharedt–1	 0.09	(0.06) 0.14	(0.12) 0.07	(0.06) 0.03	(0.07)
Group	Activityt	 1.15***	(0.39) ‐0.31	(0.25) ‐0.25	(0.36) ‐0.22	(0.52)
Shockedt	 	 108.24*** (24.53) 82.18** (32.99)	 ‐40.70	(42.69)
Shockedt	X	Amount	Sharedt–1	 	 ‐0.14	(0.19) ‐0.19	(0.13) 1.16**	(0.55)
Shockedt	X	Group	Activityt	 	 2.48	(1.51) 2.28** (1.14) 5.66***	(1.73)
Periodt	 ‐0.92	(1.43) ‐1.18	(1.76) ‐2.78** (1.16) ‐2.30	(1.87)
Constant	 72.71***	(22.64) 45.60** (22.27) 72.87*** (16.62)	 73.13**	(33.38)
N	 280 161 210 161	
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses	are	clustered	at	the	group‐level.	Dependent	variable	is	the	6 
amount	received	in	sharing.	Statistical	significance:	***:	p<0.01;	**:	p<0.05	7 
	 The	first	model	shows	results	for	the	Reward	Treatment,	which	does	not	include	a	shock	8 
and	therefore	related	variables	are	not	included.	Consistent	with	H1,	the	Group_Activityt	coefficient	9 
is	positive	and	statistically	significant.	Conversely,	whether	the	individual	shared	resources	in	the	10 
previous	round	is	unknown	and,	as	expected,	the	Amount_Sharedt–1	variable	is	not	significant.	Thus,	11 
consistent	with	Sefton,	Shupp,	and	Walker	(39),	individuals	used	the	sharing	mechanism	to	reward	12 
cooperative	behavior	in	the	group	activity	decision.	However,	the	magnitude	of	the	effect	is	13 
relatively	modest.	Each	hour	allocated	to	the	group	activity	yielded	a	return	of	5.15	rubles—1.15	14 
received	from	sharing	plus	4	rubles	from	the	group	activity—which	is	only	about	half	of	the	10	15 
ruble	return	from	an	hour	allocated	to	the	individual	activity.	Recall	that	every	hour	allocated	to	the	16 
group	activity	yields	4	rubles	for	the	individual,	as	well	as	each	of	the	other	group	members	(20	17 
rubles	per	hour	which	is	evenly	divided	among	all	five	group	members).	18 
	 The	next	three	models	include	interactions	of	whether	the	individual	was	shocked,	the	19 
allocation	to	the	group	activity	in	the	current	round,	and	the	amount	shared	in	the	previous	round.	20 
14	
In	all	treatments,	individuals	conditioned	sharing	decisions	on	the	available	information,	and	1 
unavailable	information	is	not	significant,	as	expected.	In	the	Risk	Treatment,	participants	received	2 
an	average	of	108.24	rubles	just	for	incurring	a	shock,	supporting	the	hypothesis	(H2)	that	people	3 
use	sharing	to	assist	those	in	need.	With	more	information	about	other	group	members’	behavior	in	4 
the	Risk/Reward	and	Reputation	Treatments,	sharing	was	still	directed	toward	those	in	need,	and	5 
the	amount	received	increased	for	those	individuals	with	higher	levels	of	cooperation	in	the	group	6 
activity	(Figure	1.).		In	the	Risk/Reward	treatment,	those	who	experienced	a	shock	continued	to	7 
receive	some	support	that	was	independent	of	their	actions	(82.18	rubles),	but	subjects	receiving	a	8 
shock	also	received	an	additional	2.28	rubles	per	hour	allocated	to	the	group	activity	(consistent	9 
with	H3).	In	the	Reputation	treatment,	behavior	in	both	the	current	and	previous	rounds	was	10 
common	knowledge.	In	support	of	H4,	sharing	was	conditioned	on	both	the	shocked	individual’s	11 
most	recent	sharing	decision	(period	t–1)	and	the	most	recent	group	activity	decision	(period	t).	12 
For	each	ruble	shared,	shocked	players	received	1.16	rubles	in	sharing.	For	each	hour	allocated	to	13 
the	group	activity,	shocked	players	received	5.66	rubles	in	sharing.	In	both	the	Risk/Reward	and	14 
Reputation	Treatments,	sharing	was	not	used	to	reward	cooperation	independent	of	the	shock.		15 
Instead,	sharing	was	directed	only	toward	those	in	need	and	was	conditioned	on	their	cooperation. 16 
15	
	1 
Figure	1.	Predicted	individual	amount	received	in	sharing,	conditioned	on	whether	the	2 
individual	received	a	shock,	using	coefficients	in	Table	2.	3 
Group	Activity.		In	the	first	five	rounds	(Stage	1),	all	groups	participated	in	the	Baseline	Treatment.	4 
In	Stage	1,	average	allocations	to	the	group	activity	(about	40%	of	the	initial	endowment)	were	5 
consistent	with	results	from	other	linear	public	goods	games	(2,	46).		Table	3	presents	the	results	of	6 
two	random	effects	models	for	the	group	activity	decision	in	Stage	2	(rounds	6‐13	only).	In	these	7 
regressions	the	dependent	variable	Yit	is	the	individual	allocation	to	the	group	activity	of	subject	i	in	8 
round	t.	Model	2	adds	individual	characteristics	and	fixed	effects	for	the	communities.	To	protect	9 
subject	confidentiality	and	to	make	data	publically	available	for	replication	we	have	not	identified	10 
specific	communities,	gender,	or	race	in	the	regression	results.	We	exploit	the	within‐subject	design	11 
by	using	the	individual’s	average	group	allocation	over	all	five	rounds	of	Stage	1	Baseline	as	an	12 
independent	variable	(Baseline	Group	Activity).	Since	the	idiosyncratic	environmental	risk	was	13 
unavoidable,	cooperation	in	the	Risk	Treatment	should	be	unaffected	by	risk,	which	is	precisely	14 
what	the	results	in	Table	3	suggest.	However,	contrary	to	H5,	the	ability	to	share	failed	to	increase	15 
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16	
cooperation	in	both	the	Risk/Reward	and	Reputation	treatments.	Although	results	indicate	sharing	1 
with	those	experiencing	the	shock	is	conditioned	on	the	individual’s	allocation	to	the	group	activity	2 
(Table	2),	the	levels	of	sharing	are	insufficient	to	induce	an	increase	in	cooperation.	If	a	person	3 
receives	a	shock	in	the	Reputation	Treatment,	the	return	from	an	hour	allocated	to	the	group	4 
activity	was	9.66	rubles	(5.66	as	reward	for	an	allocation	via	sharing	plus	4	from	the	group	5 
activity),	which	is	still	lower	than	the	per	hour	return	of	10	rubles	from	the	individual	activity.		6 
	7 
	 	8 
17	
Table	3.	Individual	Allocation	to	Group	Activity	(Stage	2	only,	rounds	6‐13)	1 
	 Model	1	 Model	2	
Reward	Treatment	 omitted	 omitted	
Risk	Treatment	 ‐1.642	(1.76)	 ‐1.849	(1.60)	
Risk/Reward	Treatment	 ‐0.961	(1.74)	 ‐0.947	(1.77)	
Reputation	Treatment	 0.380	(2.86)	 0.642	(2.54)	
Round	 ‐0.095	(0.16)	 ‐0.095	(0.16)	
Baseline	Group	Activity	 0.775***	(0.10) 0.754***	(0.11)	
Gender	1	 	 ‐1.525	(1.52)	
Age	 	 0.099**	(0.04)	
Race	1	 	 ‐0.206	(2.07)	
Community	1	 	 ‐3.427**	(1.42)
Community	2	 	 ‐1.595	(1.73)	
Community	3	 	 omitted	
Constant	 3.616	(2.70)	 2.375	(2.93)	
N	 1088	 1072	
Robust	standard	errors	are	clustered	at	the	group‐level.	Baseline	Group	Activity	is	the	mean	of	the	2 
individual’s	decisions	in	the	Stage	1	Baseline	treatment	(rounds	1‐5).	Dependent	variable	is	the	3 
individual	allocation	to	the	group	activity.	Statistical	significance:	***:	p<0.01;	**:	p<0.05	4 
	 Thus,	we	find	some	support	for	Panchanathan	&	Boyd’s	(43)	model	of	indirect	reciprocity.	5 
Individuals	in	need	do	receive	substantial	support,	and,	when	possible,	this	support	is	conditioned	6 
on	their	reputations	for	cooperation.	However,	the	benefits	from	a	positive	reputation	did	not	7 
exceed	the	costs	of	participating	in	the	group	activity,	and	as	a	result,	the	ability	to	share	did	not	8 
increase	cooperation.	9 
18	
Discussion	1 
We	systematically	examined	the	interactions	of	strategic	and	environmental	risks	among	people	in	2 
Kamchatka	who	face	these	challenges	repeatedly	in	the	post‐Soviet	era	(47).	Introducing	3 
idiosyncratic	environmental	risk	in	the	social	dilemma	increased	interdependence,	and	people	4 
responded	by	channeling	resources	to	those	in	need,	rewarding	individuals	for	cooperation,	and	5 
punishing	individuals	who	did	not	cooperate.	The	ability	to	share	as	a	tool	to	mitigate	6 
environmental	risk	increased	the	interdependence	among	group	members.	As	a	result,	high	levels	7 
of	sharing	were	achieved	without	direct	reciprocity	or	a	strong	commitment	device.	Observed	8 
sharing	is,	however,	consistent	with	local	sharing	norms.	We	find	strong	evidence	for	sharing,	even	9 
without	reputations,	which	is	consistent	with	a	model	of	pro‐social	behavior	(and	related	10 
experimental	results)	in	which	preferences	for	keeping	social	rules	are	the	driving	force	behind	11 
pro‐social	behavior	(48).	12 
When	current	or	past	behavior	was	observable,	sharing	was	conditioned	on	observed	13 
cooperative	behavior.	In	the	Reward	Treatment,	individuals	who	participated	more	in	the	group	14 
activity	received	more	from	sharing,	consistent	with	previous	studies	that	emphasize	the	15 
importance	of	rewards,	punishments,	and	reputations	for	the	emergence	of	cooperation	(42,	49).	16 
The	positive	relationship	identified	between	sharing	and	allocations	to	the	public	good	in	the	17 
Risk/Reward	and	Reputation	Treatments	suggests	that	when	both	strategic	and	environmental	18 
risks	are	present	in	a	social	dilemma,	the	effects	of	strategic	risks	depend	on	environmental	risks.	19 
These	results	have	important	implications	for	research	on	risk‐pooling,	the	role	of	reputations,	20 
rewards,	and	punishments	in	theories	of	cooperation,	and	more	generally,	the	role	of	21 
environmental	variability	in	human	adaptation	and	resilience.	22 
	 Ethnographic	research	on	risk‐pooling	emphasizes	the	importance	of	supporting	those	in	23 
need	and	mechanisms	of	reputation	to	maintain	cooperation	(25,	50).	Lab	experiments	inspired	by	24 
19	
this	research	have	demonstrated	that	high‐variance	resources	and	reputations	can	play	a	key	role	1 
in	the	emergence	of	risk‐pooling,	dramatically	increasing	reciprocal	exchanges	among	individuals	2 
relative	to	low‐variance	resources	(51)	and	that	risk‐pooling	strategies	can	increase	individual	and	3 
pair‐wise	survival	in	environments	with	high	degrees	of	risk	(52).	Similarly,	agent‐based	4 
simulations	have	shown	increased	environmental	harshness—which	can	be	mitigated	via	5 
cooperation—can	amplify	cooperation	(53).	Each	of	these	studies	emphasizes	the	impact	of	6 
interdependence	on	the	emergence	of	cooperation.	We	contribute	to	this	work	by	demonstrating	7 
how	asymmetries	of	need	caused	by	stochastic	environmental	risks	or	“shocks”	interact	with	the	8 
strategic	risks	tied	to	rewards,	punishments,	and	reputations	to	increase	interdependence	and	9 
enhance	risk‐pooling.	In	both	the	Risk/Reward	and	Reputation	Treatments,	individuals	who	10 
contribute	more	to	the	public	good	receive	more	via	sharing,	but	only	when	they	suffer	a	shock.	11 
These	interactions	between	strategic	and	environmental	risks	suggest	strategic	risks	remain	12 
important	for	precisely	those	individuals	who	benefit	most	from	risk‐pooling,	discouraging	13 
defectors	and	free‐riders.	Indeed,	we	found	the	effectiveness	of	risk‐pooling	increased	when	people	14 
had	the	ability	to	monitor	and	act	upon	reputations	across	multiple	rounds.	While	previous	15 
research	has	emphasized	the	importance	of	exogenous	commitment	devices,	formal	institutions,	16 
endogenous	group‐formation,	and	direct	reciprocity	for	effective	risk‐pooling,	our	experiments	17 
show	that	risk‐pooling	can	emerge	from	endogenous	reputation	dynamics	and	indirect	reciprocity.			18 
Although	the	interaction	of	strategic	and	environmental	risk	enhanced	the	effectiveness	of	19 
risk‐pooling,	we	did	not	observe	systematic	increases	in	the	group	activity	reported	by	previous	20 
studies	where	rewards	are	offered	in	the	context	of	a	social	dilemma	(5,	39,	42).	One	explanation	is	21 
that	the	benefits	of	good	reputations	for	cooperators	never	exceed	the	costs	of	contributing	to	the	22 
public	good.	Previous	studies	with	a	similar	two‐dilemma	design	amplify	the	impact	of	reputations	23 
by	increasing	the	relative	costs	and	benefits	(i.e.	efficiency)	of	rewards	and/or	punishments,	often	24 
with	ratios	as	high	as	1:3	(4–7,	54).	Thus,	increasing	levels	of	cooperation	observed	in	previous	25 
20	
experiments	may	not	be	due	to	the	presence	or	absence	of	rewards	and	punishments	per	se,	but	the	1 
presence	of	highly	efficient	rewards	and	punishments	(55–57).	While	highly	efficient	2 
reward/punishment	mechanisms	have	been	shown	to	increase	levels	of	cooperation	in	3 
experiments,	it	is	less	clear	how	often	such	mechanisms	are	available	in	naturally	occurring	4 
contexts	of	cooperation	(58).	Indeed,	the	way	participants	condition	aid	to	needy	players	based	on	5 
cooperation	reflects	local	norms	of	indirect	punishment,	which	are	more	commonly	observed	in	our	6 
study	region	than	norms	of	direct,	individual	costly	punishment.			7 
	 In	addition	to	addressing	individual	strategic	behavior,	our	study	highlights	the	important	8 
role	of	factors	that	increase	interdependence	among	individuals.	We	investigated	one	factor—9 
stochastic	resource	acquisition—that	increases	interdependence	by	creating	consumption	deficits	10 
that	can	be	overcome	by	pooling	resources	through	sharing.	Such	deficits	might	also	arise	from	11 
differences	in	individual/household	productive	capacity	and	consumptive	needs	(59)	or	stochastic	12 
differences	in	harvests	due	to	poor	health	or	other	misfortunes	(60,	61).	Our	experiments	13 
incorporate	consumption	deficits	via	stochastic	shocks,	providing	a	specific	factor	for	amplifying	14 
the	impact	of	reputations	relative	to	the	highly	efficient	reward	and	punishment	mechanisms	15 
utilized	in	previous	studies.		16 
	 Scholars	studying	processes	of	contemporary	human	adaptation	to	unprecedented	forces	of	17 
global	climatic,	economic,	political,	and	cultural	change	have	emphasized	the	crucial	role	of	18 
strategies	that	mitigate	environmental	risks	(62).	Many	components	of	contemporary	adaptation—19 
including	the	role	of	traditional	ecological	knowledge,	social	networks,	institutions,	and	other	forms	20 
of	social	capital—depend	on	cooperation	among	individuals	to	maintain	resilience	in	the	face	of	21 
shocks	and	perturbations	(63).	Therefore,	understanding	how	environmental	risks	interact	with	22 
strategic	risks	to	affect	the	emergence	and	stability	of	cooperation	can	improve	our	attempts	to	23 
adapt	to	the	challenges	we	face	in	contemporary	environments.	Our	research	suggests	theories	of	24 
21	
cooperation	can	contribute	to	this	goal	by	investigating	a	broader	range	of	factors	that	increase	1 
interdependence.	2 
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